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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
GEOFFREY ALLAN LINDSAY, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20030964-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 2001). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the evidence was insufficient to establish proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Lindsay committed the crimes charged? CC[A] trial court's verdict in a criminal 
case will be set aside only if that verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence or i f 
the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has 
been made.'" City ofOrem v Lee, 846 P.2d 450, 452 (Utah App. 1993) (citing Slate v. 
Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)). This issue was not preserved at trial, but is 
reviewed for plain error. 
2. Whether Lindsay's due process rights were violated? Whether a defendant's due 
process rights have been violated is a question of law reviewed for correctness. See 
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Color Country Management v. Labor Com% 2001 UT App 370, \ 15, 38 P.3d 969. This 
issue was not preserved at trial, but is reviewed for plain error. 
3. Whether the trial court plainly erred in finding Lindsay guilty? Whether a trial 
court plainly erred is a question of law reviewed for correctness. State v. Smit, 2004 UT 
App 222, Tf 7, — P.3d ---:. 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
All other controlling statutory provisions and rules are set forth in the Addenda. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Geoffrey Allan Lindsay appeals from the judgment, sentence and commitment of 
the Fifth District Court after being convicted illegal possession/use of a controlled 
substance, a class A misdemeanor and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class A 
misdemeanor. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Geoffrey Allan Lindsay was charged by information filed in the Fifth Judicial 
District Court on or about December 19, 2002, with possession of a controlled substance, 
a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), and with 
possession of drug paraphernalia, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code 
Annotated § 58-37a-5(l) (R. 1-2). 
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The arraignment hearing was held on December 305 2002, whereupon Lindsay 
entered a plea of not guilty to both charges (R. 8; 76: 3). Lindsay also stated he would 
hire a lawyer to represent him (R. 76: 4). 
A bench trial was held on March 10, 2003 (R. 12; 77), Lindsay was not present 
and was convicted on both counts in absentia (R. 12; 77: 3). 
A review hearing was held on August 14^  2003, (R. 25 ). 
On September 25, 2003, Lindsay was sentenced to a term of 180 days for the 
controlled substance conviction and to a term of 180 days for the paraphernalia 
conviction (R. 34). The total time for both sentences was suspended and Lindsay was 
placed on probation for 24 months (R. 34-36). The trial judge signed the sentencing 
minute entry on October 2, 2003 (R. 40-43). 
On October 31, 2003, Lindsay filed a Notice of Appeal to the Utah Court of 
Appeals from the judgment and sentence entered in the above case (R. 38-39). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Bench Trial 
Lindsay was not present at the bench trial and did not have any representation of 
counsel (R. 77: 3). The trial court observed that notice was sent to Lindsay and then 
concluded that his absence was voluntary (R. 77: 3). Without presenting any evidence, 
the prosecutor stated: 
Your Honor, Officer Danny Kroff and also Deputy Crouse had contact on 
December 19, 2002 at the car wash in Hurrican. He was found at that time in 
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possession of a baggy of marijuana. The baggy being paraphernalia and, 
obviously, the marijuana being the controlled substance. 
(R. 77: 3). The State presented no witnesses or testimony other than the prosecutor's 
proffer, nor did they introduce anything into evidence (R. 77: 3). Based solely on the 
prosecutor's proffer, the trial court found Lindsay guilty of both counts (R. 77: 3). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The evidence was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Lindsay 
committed the crimes he was charges with considering the fact that absolutely no 
evidence was presented at trial to substantiate the charges. Moreover, Lindsay's due 
process rights were violated because he was convicted without any evidence presented 
against him. Thus, the trial court plainly erred by finding Lindsay guilty because it was 
patently obvious that no evidence was presented to the court to substantiate the charges. 
Therefore, this Court should reverse Lindsay's convictions. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE 
CONVICTIONS BECAUSE NO EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED AT 
TRIAL. THUS, THE FINDING OF GUILTY DENIED LINDSAY HIS 
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND THE TRIAL COURT PLAINLY 
ERRED IN FINDING LINDSAY GUILTY WHEN NO EVIDENCE 
WAS PRESENTED 
Geoffrey Lindsay was convicted of possession/use of a controlled substance and 
possession of drug paraphernalia at a bench trial (R. 77: 3). However, absolutely no 
evidence or testimony was presented against Lindsay to substantiate the charges (R. 77' 
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3). In fact, the State called no witnesses and produced no evidence whatsoever (R. 77: 3). 
Accordingly, the evidence was insufficient to support the convictions and Lindsay was 
denied his right to due process by being convicted without any testimony or evidence 
against him. Moreover, the trial court plainly erred in finding Lindsay guilty when there 
was no evidence to support the charges. 
A, No evidence was presented at trial. 
"[A] trial court's verdict in a criminal case will be set aside only if that verdict is 
against the clear weight of the evidence or ' if the appellate court otherwise reaches a 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made."' City of Or em v. Lee, 846 
P.2d 450, 452 (Utah App. 1993) (citing State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)). 
"In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence .... [the] [djefendant 'must marshal 
all evidence supporting the ... verdict and must then show this marshaled evidence is 
insufficient to support the verdict even when viewed in the light most favorable to the 
verdict.'" State v. Vessey, 967 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting State v. Lemons, 
844 P.2d 378, 381 (Utah App. 1992) cert denied 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993)). 
In this case, there is no evidence to marshal since the entire bench trial consists of 
the prosecutor proffering what he believed to be the facts to support charges against 
Lindsay and the trial judge accepting the proffer and finding Lindsay guilty based on the 
proffer alone (R. 77: 3). Since no evidence was presented, Lindsay asserts that there was 
insufficient evidence to support the convictions. 
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B. The convictions violate due process. 
Lindsay also asserts that because the convictions were based on a lack of evidence, 
or at best on hearsay statements made by the prosecutor which are entirely inadmissible 
as evidence, his right to due process was violated. 
In Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199, 206, 80 S.Ct. 624, 629, 4 L.Ed.2d 
654 (1960), the United State Supreme Court held that it is a 'Violation of due process to 
convict and punish a man without evidence of his guilt." Moreover, the Utah Supreme 
Court has held that a defendant's due process rights are violated if the State fails to prove 
the charges beyond a reasonable doubt and the defendant is convicted anyway. See State 
v. Leleae, 1999 UT App 368, U 49, 993 P.2d 232. See also, In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 
363, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1072, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) ("The reasonable-doubt standard plays 
a vital role in the American scheme of criminal procedure. It is a prime instrument for 
reducing the risk of convictions resting on factual error. The standard provides concrete 
substance for the presumption of innocence—that bedrock 'axiomatic and elementary' 
principle whose 'enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal 
law/") 
In this case, the only statements offered against Lindsay were hearsay statements 
that the prosecutor proffered before the trial court (R. 77: 3). Rule 81(e) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the "rules of procedure shall also govern in any 
aspect of criminal proceedings where there is no other applicable statute or rule...." And 
Rule 43(a) further provides : 
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In all trials, the testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally in open court, unless 
otherwise provided by these rules, the Utah Rules of Evidence, or a statute of this 
state. All evidence shall be admitted which is admissible under the Utah Rules of 
Evidence or other rules adopted by the Supreme Court. 
It is elementary that a "prosecutor is not a witness." See Donnelly v. DeChristo/oro, 416 
U.S. 637, 650, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 1875, 40 L.Ed.2d 431 (1974) (Justice Douglas dissenting). 
Moreover, "[g]uilt in a criminal case must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and by 
evidence confined to that which long experience in the common-law tradition, to some 
extent embodied in the Constitution, has crystallized into rules of evidence consistent 
with that standard." Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 1310, 
93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949). Thus, the statements made by the prosecutor constitute 
inadmissible hearsay and should not have been considered by the trial judge. 
Accordingly, Lindsay's right to due process was violated because the convictions were 
based entirely upon inadmissible statements and impermissibly shifted the burden of 
proof to the defense. 
C. The trial court plainly erred by finding Lindsay guilty when no 
evidence was offered or admitted. 
Lindsay asserts that the trial court plainly erred by finding Lindsay guilty in 
absence of any evidence supporting the charges, thus preserving the sufficiency and due 
process issues for appeal. 
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"To establish plain error. Defendant must show: c(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error 
should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the 
error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant....'" 
State v. Dominguez, 2003 UT App 158, ^ [25, 72 P.3d 127 (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 
P.2dl20L 1208 (Utah 1993)). 
As shown above, no evidence was presented at trial to support Lindsay's 
convictions. It should have been patently obvious to the trial court that the prosecutor 
could not proffer evidence to support a conviction without calling at least one witness to 
testify. Moreover, it should have been patently obvious to the trial court that no evidence 
was admitted on the record to support the charges. Therefore, it should have been 
patently obvious to the trial court that Lindsay could not be found guilty of the alleged 
charges. Accordingly, the trial court should have known that the evidence was 
insufficient to support the convictions and that Lindsay's right to due process was 
violated by a finding of guilty without any supporting evidence. 
Without this error, Lindsay would not have been convicted. Therefore, this Court 
should reverse Lindsay's convictions. 
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CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons, Lindsay asks this Court to reverse his convictions for 
illegal possession/use of a controlled substance, a class A misdemeanor, and possession 
of drug paraphernalia, a class A misdemeanor. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 8th day of September, 2004. 
Margaret P^ . Lindsay 
Counsel for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I delivered two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing 
Brief of Appellant to Brak Belnap, Washington County Attorney, 178 North 200 East, St. 
George, UT 84770, this 8th day of September, 2004. 
s*~), y 
f 
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ADDENDA 
133 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 43 
the trial court and, absent abuse of such discre 
tion, will not be upset on appeal King v 
Barron, 770 P 2 d 975 (Utah 1988) 
— S e p a r a t e i s sues . 
When a court considers it convenient or de-
sirable m the interest of justice, any separate 
issue may be tried separately Page v Utah 
Home Fire Ins Co , 15 Utah 2d 257, 391 P2d 
290 (1964) 
C i t ed m Lignell v Berg, 593 P2d 800 (Utah 
1979), Olympus Hills Shopping Ctr , Ltd v 
Smith's Food & Drug Ctrs , Inc , 889 P 2 d 445 
(Utah Ct App 1994), Stevensen v Goodson, 
924 P2d 339 (Utah 1996) 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Multiple 
Ju ry Formats and Civil Litigation Arnold v 
Eastern Airlines, 1991 B Y U L Rev 1005 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 1 Am J u r 2d Actions § 110 
et seq , 75 Am Ju r 2d Trial § 115 et seq 
C.J.S. — 1 C J S Actions §§ 109, 117 to 122, 
88 C J S Trial §§ 6 to 10 
A.L.R. — Propriety of separate trials of is-
sues of tort liability and of validity and effect of 
release, 4 A L R 3d 456 
Propriety of ordering separate trials as to 
liability and damages, under Rule 42(b) of Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, in actions involv-
ing personal injury, death, or property damage, 
7 8 A L R Fed 890 
Propriety of ordering separate trials as to 
liability and damages, under Rule 42(b) of Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, in civil rights 
actions, 79 A L R Fed 220 
Propriety of ordering separate trials as to 
liability and damages, under Rule 42(b) of Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, in actions involv-
ing patents and copyrights, 79 A L R Fed 532 
Propriety of ordering separate trials as to 
liability and damages, under Rule 42(b) of Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, in contract ac-
tions, 79 A L R Fed 812 
Propriety of ordering consolidation under 
Rule 42(a) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
m civil rights actions, 81 A L R Fed 732 
Propriety of ordering consolidation under 
Rule 42(a) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
in actions involving patents, copyrights, or 
t rademarks, 82 A L R Fed 719 
Propriety of ordering consolidation under 
Rule 42(a) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
m actions involving securities, 83 A L R Fed 
367 
Rule 43. Evidence. 
(a) Form. In all trials, the testimony of witnesses shall be taken orally in 
open court, unless otherwise provided by these rules, the Utah Rules of 
Evidence, or a statute of this state. All evidence shall be admitted which is 
admissible under the Utah Rules of Evidence or other rules adopted by the 
Supreme Court. 
(b) Evidence on motions. When a motion is based on facts not appearing of 
record the court may hear the matter on affidavits presented by the respective 
parties, but the court may direct that the matter be heard wholly or partly on 
oral testimony or depositions. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Compiler's No te s . — This rule is similar to 
Rule 43(a) and (e), F R C P 
Cross -Refe rences . — Evidence generally, 
§ 78-25-2 et seq 
Relevancy and its limits, U R E 401 to 411 
Witnesses, U R E 601 to 615 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Form 
— Open court 
Judge's request for investigation 
Motions 
—Evidentiary hearing 
Witnesses 
Cited 
Form. 
—Open court. 
Judge's request for invest igat ion. 
Failure of judge m divorce action to notify 
counsel of his asking juvenile authorities to 
investigate the homes of both parties and make 
a report thereon did not violate the require-
ment of Subdivision (a), tha t all testimony be m 
open court, to such a degree as to wa^arst a 
retrial Austad v Austad, 2 Utah 2d 49, 269 
P2d 284 (1954) 
Motions. 
—Evident iary hearing. 
Although a court can grant or deny a motion 
on the sole or combined bases of affidavits, 
depositions or oral testimony, when no deposi-
tions have been taken and disputed material 
facts are alleged m opposing affidavits, there 
should be an evidentiary hearing to aid in the 
resolution of those facts Stan Katz Real Estate, 
Inc v Chavez, 565 P2d 1142 (Utah 1977) 
